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THE CURRENT AND FUTURE STATE OF 
GUN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
WILLIAM J. VIZZARD* 
 
In spite of years of journalistic and public attention and debate, the 
United States has instituted few changes in firearms policy over the past 
century.  Opposition diluted a brief push by the Roosevelt administration in 
the 1930s and resulted in two minimalist federal statutes.  A second effort in 
the wake of the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin 
Luther King produced the Gun Control Act of 1968, which largely remains 
the primary federal law.  Even this modest control effort was subsequently 
diluted by the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986.  The Clinton 
administration managed to pass the Brady Act, requiring background 
checks on purchases from licensed firearms dealers, and a law directed at 
“assault weapons,” which sunset after ten years.  For the past two decades, 
policy activity has shifted to the state legislatures and the courts, where 
concealed carry laws have flourished and the Second Amendment has been 
recognized as an individual and fundamental right.  
Entrenched opposition in Congress and state legislatures, declining 
public support, well-organized institutional opposition, and constitutional 
constraints have limited policy options for the foreseeable future.  Given 
these constraints, advocates should focus on limited, pragmatic goals that 
include reducing gun possession and carrying by high-risk individuals, 
restricting access to firearms by prohibited persons, and utilizing firearms 
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I. A HISTORY OF EPISODIC POLITICAL FOCUS  
Firearms policy in the United States has periodically entered the policy 
agenda for almost a century.  Although federal legislation enacted in 1968 
appeared to foretell a shift away from a laissez-faire approach to policy on 
firearms, the following half-century has seen a sharp increase in the power 
of gun control opponents, a rollback of regulations, and the emergence of an 
individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment.  Future 
restrictions seem unlikely in the face of constitutional and political 
constraints, but some modest proposals may prove possible. 
A. FEDERAL 
At the national level, gun control policy has remained essentially 
unchanged for the past twenty years.  Following the 1993 passage of both 
the Brady Handgun Prevention Act (commonly termed the Brady Law) and 
federal assault weapon restrictions, the 1994 Republican congressional 
victories marked the end of any momentum for additional federal 
legislation.1  Since then, the federal assault weapon legislation, which 
appears to have had little impact,2 has sunset, and Congress has imposed 
 
 1 ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 147–54 (2012). 
2 CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, UNIV. OF PA. JERRY LEE CTR. OF CRIMINOLOGY, AN UPDATED 
ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN MARKETS AND GUN 
VIOLENCE, 1994–2003 (June 2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
204431.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5STF-W9PC (noting that, though there was a 
noticeable drop in use of assault weapons during the commission of crimes, “the 
decline . . . was offset throughout at least the late 1990s by steady or rising use of other guns 
equipped with [large capacity magazines],” but concluding that it was “premature to make 
definitive assessments of the ban’s impact on gun crime.”).  
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restrictions on the use of gun tracing results.3  Neither of these actions 
constituted a significant shift in the fundamental national policy relating to 
firearm possession and commerce. 
Despite the mass shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, 
Colorado; Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia; a movie theater in 
Aurora, Colorado; Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut; and the attempted assassination of U.S. Representative 
Gabrielle Giffords and accompanying mass shooting in Tucson, Arizona, no 
gun control legislation has passed either house of Congress since the 
sunsetting of the assault weapons ban.4  On the other hand, state legislatures 
have been far more active, primarily in liberalizing concealed carry laws.5  
However, in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, 
a few states have moved to place additional restrictions on magazine 
capacity of semiautomatic firearms.6 
In fact, the history of firearms regulation in the United States over the 
past century reflects a consistent pattern.  The early 1900s saw a number of 
states move to restrict handguns in various ways, followed by many of 
those states retreating from those restrictions.7  This was followed by a 
period of quiescence, when neither the states nor the federal government 
took action.  The 1930s marked the next period of activity.  In 1934, the 
National Firearms Act (NFA) was passed; the Federal Firearms Act (FFA) 
followed in 1938.8  This period also demonstrated another recurring pattern.  
The original proposals for the NFA would have incorporated both handguns 
and what are currently referred to in common usage as assault rifles into the 
law’s licensing and tax requirements.9  However, the proposed legislation 
 
3 James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, After Gun Industry Pressure, Veil Was Draped 
over Tracing Data, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, at A11. 
4 Jennifer Steinhauer, Despite Tearful Pleas, No Real Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 
2013, at A1.  See generally PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 105–06 tbl.6.2 (2014).   
5 Alan Berlow, Concealed Carry, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2013/12/gun-law-concealed-carry-permit-utah-101113.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HXM6-86UR.  As Berlow discusses, only California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island 
retain discretionary permit laws as of 2013.  Id. 
6 See Karen Yourish & Larry Buchanan, State Gun Laws Enacted in the Year Since 
Newtown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2013, at A20. 
7 See WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, SHOTS IN THE DARK: THE POLICY, POLITICS AND SYMBOLISM 
OF GUN CONTROL 87–88 (2000).  
8 Id. at 89–91.  
 9 “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That for the purposes of this act the term ‘firearm’ means a 
pistol, revolver, shotgun having a barrel less than sixteen inches in length, or any other 
firearm capable of being concealed on the person, a muffler or silencer therefor, or a 
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was quickly amended to include only machine guns, sawed-off rifles and 
shotguns, silencers, and a few other odd firearms.10 
Subsequently, public and legislative attention turned away from the 
issue of firearms regulation.  It would take a presidential assassination to 
rekindle it.11  Although Senator Dodd had introduced a bill to restrict mail 
order sales of handguns prior to the assassination, the bill had not moved.  
Following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Dodd amended 
the bill to cover all firearms and began a series of hearings.12  Between 1963 
and 1968, a combination of rising crime rates, administration support, and 
the murders of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy finally 
generated enough antigun political support to push the Gun Control Act of 
1968 (GCA) through Congress.13  The GCA, with subsequent amendments, 
remains the primary federal statute governing the possession of, and 
commerce in, firearms.14 
Although a number of unsuccessful bills expanding control of firearms 
were introduced during the 1970s, and some symbolic legislation relating to 
so-called “cop killer bullets” and “plastic guns” became law,15 no 
significant new legislation passed Congress for almost two decades after the 
passage of the GCA.16  During that time, organized opposition to firearms 
regulation intensified.17  When new federal legislation was enacted in 1986, 
it reflected both the conservative political turn of U.S. politics and the 
increased organization and intensity of the pro-gun lobby.18   
The Firearms Owners Protection Act (FOPA) significantly modified 
the GCA in several ways.  Among the most significant changes were 
reducing a licensed dealer’s record, reducing record falsification and failure 
to record from felonies to misdemeanors, and redefining engaging in the 
 
machine gun.  The term ‘machine gun’ means any weapon designed to shoot automatically 
or semiautomatically twelve or more shots without reloading.”  H.R. 9066, 73d Cong. (1934) 
(enacted). 
10 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1934); Carol Skalnik Leff & Mark H. Leff, The Politics of 
Ineffectiveness: Federal Firearms Legislation, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 48, 
60–61 (1981).  
 11 VIZZARD, supra note 7. 
 12 Id. at 93–94.  
13 Id. at 93–105. 
14 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931 (2012); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5861, §§ 5971-5872 (2012).  See 
William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 79 (1999), 
for a broader discussion of the GCA.  
 15 VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 129–32. 
 16 See COOK & GOSS, supra note 4, 105–06 tbl.6.2.  
17 VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 59–72.  
18 Id. 
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business of dealing in firearms.19  The new definition required proof of 
conducting a “regular course of trade or business with the principal 
objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale 
of firearms.”20  In addition, the change specifically exempted anyone 
making “occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the 
enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part 
of his personal collection of firearms.”21  The federal government was 
specifically prohibited from implementing regulations to require reporting 
of gun purchases or to create a gun registration system, and inspections of 
dealers were limited to one per year.22 
With one significant addition, the GCA, as revised by the FOPA, 
remains the primary federal law regulating commerce in and possession of 
firearms.  That addition, the Brady Law, requiring a waiting period and 
criminal records check before a dealer may deliver a handgun to a 
purchaser, passed both houses of Congress and was signed by President 
Clinton in 1993.23  An amendment to the bill inserted a sunset clause on the 
waiting period and mandated its replacement by an instant check system for 
all firearms sales by licensees within five years.24  Although a federal ban 
on certain firearms defined as assault weapons and on the future production 
of firearm magazines with a capacity exceeding ten rounds was enacted the 
following year, the law contained a ten-year sunset clause.  Congress failed 
to renew the assault weapons ban in 2004, allowing it to expire.25 
Thus, federal policy relating to firearms possession and commerce has 
experienced only three notable changes in the past seventy-five years.  
Since the 1968 enactment of the GCA, one of these policy changes, FOPA, 
has significantly weakened gun policy.  Although the issue has recurrently 
intruded on the public policy agenda, received significant media attention, 
and stirred passions, particularly among opponents of control, Congress has 
not acted on any significant legislation for two decades.26  Given that a 
Democratic Senate failed to pass any legislation in the aftermath of the 
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting,27 it appears unlikely that 
legislation of any substance will emerge from Congress any time soon. 
 
19 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012). 
 20 18 U.S.C. § 921(A)(21)(c) (2012). 
21 Id. 
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 923(g)(1)(B)(ii)(I), 923(g)(1)(C)(i) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2012). 
23 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (2012). 
24 Id. § 922(s). 
25 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Effort to Renew Weapons Ban Falters on Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
9, 2004, at A1; see also SPITZER, supra note 1, at147 .  
 26 COOK & GOSS, supra note 4, at 105–06 tbl.6.2. 
 27 Ed O’Keefe, Gun Background Check Compromise, Assault Weapon Ban Fail in 
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B. STATE AND LOCAL 
Far more activity has occurred at the state and local level.  In 1976, 
Washington, D.C. enacted the strictest handgun law in the country, 
essentially banning the private ownership of handguns and imposing 
restrictions on the possession and storage of long guns.28  Although some 
anticipated that this would be the initial act in a series of strict state laws 
applying to handguns, this did not prove to be the case.  A 1976 
Massachusetts initiative, Question 5, which would have outlawed private 
ownership of handguns, was defeated.29   The subsequent defeat of 
Proposition 15, a measure to freeze the existing California handgun 
population, in 1982, clearly signaled that the D.C. law did not foretell a new 
wave of gun restrictions.30  Although a few states added some minor 
restrictions during the next thirty years, the primary trend in state law was 
one of liberalizing restrictions on the concealed carrying of firearms.   
Until the latter part of the twentieth century, most states either 
prohibited carrying a concealed firearm on the person away from one’s 
home or business or required a permit to do so.31  Typically, the permits 
were issued by local sheriffs or police chiefs, who had the discretion to 
deny or issue a permit based upon their judgment.32  A few exceptions 
existed.  Vermont, for example, had no laws relating to concealed or open 
carry.33  On the opposite pole, Wisconsin had no provision for issuing a 
permit.34  In 1961, the state of Washington revised its statute to guarantee 
all applicants, except those prohibited by law from possessing a firearm 
 
Senate, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2013/04/17/senate-to-vote-on-amendments-to-gun-bill-with-background-check-
plan-in-doubt/, archived at http://perma.cc/3W9U-F5BS. 
28 See Meg Smith & Leah Carliner, A History of the DC Gun Ban, WASH. POST (June 26, 
2008, 10:30 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/
AR2007071700689.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5R5K-HX4G.   
29 SEC’Y OF COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS—
STATISTICS BY YEAR: 1919–2012, available at www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/elebalm/
balmresults.html#year1976, archived at http://perma.cc/6KD8-P22V.   
30 The law would have required registration of all handguns in the state at time of 
passage, but prohibited private individuals from acquiring new ones.  See VIZZARD, supra 
note 7, at 128. 
31 See JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 34 (2002).  
32 JEFFREY R. SNYDER, CATO INST., FIGHTING BACK: CRIME, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE 
RIGHT TO CARRY A HANDGUN 4 (Oct. 22, 1997), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa284.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BM5H-U3B5. 
33 See id. at 28 n.1. 
34 See Patrick Marley & Bill Glauber, Wisconsin Senate Passes Concealed-Carry Bill, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 14, 2011), available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/
statepolitics/123826279.html#ixzz2wFg9PORF, archived at http://perma.cc/T7HH-6C8U.  
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such as violent felons, the right to a permit.35  The change in the law 
apparently attracted little national attention.  However, when Florida passed 
a similar liberalization in 1987, the new policy attracted nationwide 
attention and initiated a national trend.36  The move to so-called “shall 
issue” states accelerated rapidly during the 1990s.37  By November 2013, 
only nine states retained discretion for the issuance of permits, and several 
states had either eliminated the requirement for a permit or were in the 
process of doing so.38  Although efforts by gun rights advocates to pass a 
state reciprocity requirement relating to concealed carry permits have failed 
to gain congressional approval, thirty-five states currently recognize out-of-
state permits and several issue permits to nonresidents.39  Overlapping the 
movement to mandatory issuance of concealed carry permits is the 
“constitutional carry” movement, which seeks to eliminate any requirement 
of a permit.40 
As a result of the 2010 midterm elections, the rise of the Tea Party, 
and the subsequent reapportionment of state legislative districts,41 the 
balance of power in a number of state legislatures significantly shifted to 
conservatives opposed to firearms regulation and federal authority.42  The 
magnitude of the shift can be seen in the effort by some state legislatures to 
pass legislation that nullifies all federal gun laws and criminalizes their 
enforcement.43  Given the fact that reapportionment will not occur until 
2020, it is unlikely that the power balance of state legislatures will change 
appreciably enough to favor firearms control legislation before then.44  At 
 
35 VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 145.   
36 Id. at 37.  
37 See id.   
38 Berlow, supra note 5.  California, Hawaii, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware retain discretionary permit laws.  
See NAT’L RIFLE ASSOC.-INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, STATE LAWS, http://www.
nraila.org/gun-laws/state-laws.aspx (last visited June 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
7BW7-BWCF.  
39 Berlow, supra note 5.   
40 Jonathan Ellis, 12 States on Path to Guns with No Permits, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2012, 
at 3A; Charles C.W. Cooke, AR to Become ‘Constitutional Carry’ State, NAT’L R. ONLINE 
(July 2, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/352575/ar-become-
constitutional-carry-state-charles-c-w-cooke#, archived at http://perma.cc/74TM-5QGH. 
 41 Steven Shepard, Democrats Still Paying the Price for 2010 Losses, NAT'L J. (Jan. 21, 
2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/democrats-still-paying-the-price-for-2010-
losses-20140121, archived at http://perma.cc/WLG5-XRZX.  
42 See Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at SR1. 
43 Steve Chapman, Nullifying Gun Laws, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2013, at 23.  
44 See Bob Benenson, In Remapping, No Guarantees, CONGRESS.ORG (Mar. 7, 2011), 
https://ssl.congress.org/news/2011/03/11/in_remapping_no_guarantees, archived at http://
perma.cc/6RFA-QYJT; Alex Roarty, Where the Biggest Wave Hit, NAT’L J., Nov. 6, 2010, at 
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the other end of the spectrum, a few states have enacted more restrictive 
legislation.45  However, these initiatives were limited to additional 
restrictions on paramilitary firearms, limits on magazine capacity, and 
records checks for private buyers, all policies that already existed in some 
states.  In Colorado, new laws mandating record checks for all gun buyers 
and limiting firearm magazines to fifteen rounds resulted in the recall of 
two members of the state legislature.46  Although predicting changes in the 
political winds is a risky activity, it appears unlikely that the majority of 
states will institute laws significantly changing the direction of firearms 
policy. 
C. THE COURTS 
While Congress has taken no significant action since the passage of the 
Brady Law, the Supreme Court has taken monumental action.  Although 
impact on day-to-day policy has thus far primarily affected only 
Washington, D.C. and Illinois, the potential extent of these two court 
decisions is far-reaching.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court 
invalidated the District of Columbia’s virtual ban on handgun possession 
and held that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to 
possess firearms.47  In McDonald v. Chicago, the Court extended the 
potential restraint on legislation to the states by finding that it was a 
fundamental right and thereby incorporated the Second Amendment under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 
The McDonald case may prove the more important decision for gun 
policy in the long run.  Given the history of gun regulation, a highly 
restrictive federal statute always seemed an unlikely event.  However, both 
Chicago and the District of Columbia had already demonstrated the 
capacity of local governments to move toward virtual prohibition of 
handguns, and the possibility of some states following suit does not seem 
beyond the realm of possibility. 
In addition to blocking any future move toward handgun prohibition, 
these two decisions have virtually assured a continuing series of future legal 
actions to challenge existing controls at all levels, which have already 
 
10.  
45 See, e.g., Ian Lovett, In California, New Package of Gun Laws but One Snag, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at A11; see also Peter Applebome & Ray Rivera, In Connecticut, Gun 
Curbs Had Difficult Path, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2013, at A1.  
46 Katie Glueck, Colorado Lawmakers Recalled over Guns, POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2013, 
2:51 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/colorado-recall-guns-referendum-96566.
html#ixzz2kfDAGwUm, archived at http://perma.cc/ALD4-SBWL.   
47 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622, 635 (2008). 
48 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).  
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begun.49  Heller and McDonald did not occur by accident.  They were the 
result of a long, committed, and well-funded effort in pursuit of these goals 
by those who view gun rights as fundamental.50  Although the outcome of 
future litigation remains uncertain, the institutional forces that precipitated 
these decisions will not evaporate any more than did advocates of racial 
equality after Brown v. Board of Education.  Just as racial integration 
preceded a push for school busing and affirmative action, actions to further 
reduce existing gun controls will follow Heller and McDonald. 
II. PUBLIC OPINION AND INTEREST GROUP SUPPORT 
Although surveys reflected an increase in nationwide support for 
requiring record checks on private gun sales in the wake of the Sandy Hook 
shooting, the support quickly declined.51  The long-term trend for over 
twenty years has been a decline in public support for more regulation.52  In 
fact, the attention devoted to firearms regulation appears to have 
significantly increased firearms sales in the short run.53 
An examination of book sales, letters to the editor, and blog 
commentaries all support the conclusion that gun control opponents are far 
more intensely and consistently engaged than gun control advocates.  This 
is further supported historically by the preponderance of letters opposing 
gun control received by legislators.54 
 
49 See Maura Dolan, Concealed Gun Law Overturned, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 14, 2014, 
at A3; Adam Liptak, Justices Refuse Case on New York Gun Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 
2013, at A13; Ann E. Marimow & Aaron C. Davis, Md. Gun Law Gets Court’s Backing, 
WASH. POST., Mar. 22, 2013, at B01; Jessica Gresko, DC Again Asks Judge to Uphold Gun 
Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 5, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/
local/DC-Again-Asks-Judge-to-Uphold-Gun-Laws-230704001.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/R7VG-T7WY. 
50 VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 53–54, 64.  
51 See Rebecca Ballhaus, Poll: Support for Tighter Gun Checks Ebbs, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
13, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/12/13/poll-support-for-tighter-
gun-checks-softens/, archived at http://perma.cc/8JW6-2TNG.   
52 See Lydia Saad, U.S. Remains Divided over Passing Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP (Oct. 
25 ,  2013) ,  h t tp : / /www.gal lup .co m/ pol l /165563/ remains-d ivided-p ass in g-
stricter-gun-laws.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/APU5-8B85.  
53  See Bruce Kennedy, Will 2013 Mark Record Gun Sales in US?, MSN MONEY (July 
19, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://money.msn.com/now/post--will-2013-mark-record-gun-sales-in-
us, archived at http://perma.cc/9L5T-MJXA; Ben Rooney, Ruger CEO: Gun Sales 
Returning to Normal Levels, CNNMONEY (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2013/08/01/investing/sturm-ruger-gun-sales/, archived at http://perma.cc/WM8L-3E3F.   
54 Although accurate book sales figures are not publicly available, Amazon.com rankings 
provide a useful proxy.  This author has followed the gun issue for over forty years in a 
number of major newspapers and on numerous blogs, interviewed a number of federal and 
state legislative staff members, and worked in the ATF’s headquarters.  The preponderance 
of opposition communication was apparent in all instances.  See also Sam Stein & Paul 
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The decline in public support for gun control likely results from a 
variety of forces.  First, public support for and trust in government has 
declined markedly since the 1960s.55  Second, as Benjamin Barber has 
argued, all American political narratives are rights-based.56  The existence 
of the Second Amendment and a persistent effort by opponents of gun 
control to shape the argument as one of individual rights has produced these 
results.   
In addition, the gun rights advocacy infrastructure far exceeds the 
meager gun control advocacy infrastructure.  Those opposing gun 
regulation have two distinct advantages.  Gun enthusiasts can organize 
around specific institutions and events such as gun stores, gun shows, 
shooting ranges, and shooting activities.  A thriving gun press activates and 
links supporters, and numerous organizations built around shooting and gun 
interests provide structure for organizing.57  Moreover, gun control 
advocates lack any such specific organizational advantages and most do not 
rank gun control as their primary issue.58   
However, the successes of gun control opponents may hold the seeds 
for their future problems.  Subsequent to the highly publicized Trayvon 
Martin homicide, Florida experienced at least two more high-profile 
incidents of minor confrontations escalating to the shooting death of 
unarmed persons.59  It remains to be seen how such incidents, involving 
 
Blumenthal, The Gun Lobby: Why the NRA Is the Baddest Force in Politics, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec 17, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/17/gun-lobby-
nra_n_2317885.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UV6K-NMA8; How the NRA Relies More 
on Grassroots Mobilization Rather than Lobbying, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 
TUMBLELOG (Dec. 18, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://usnews.tumblr.com/post/38229308383/how-
the-nra-relies-more-on-grassroots-mobilization#.UyoLD86a-So, archived at http://perma.cc/
5FT5-H82X.  
55 See Trust in Government, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-
government.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BRK7-WC2Q.  
56 See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 14–16 (1984). 
57 See Walter Hickey, How the NRA Became the Most Powerful Special Interest in 
Washington, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nra-
lobbying-money-national-rifle-association-washington-2012-12#ixzz2ppzW3JqN, archived 
at http://perma.cc/63UX-W2TW. 
58 See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Fewer Mention Economic Issues as Top Problem, 
GALLUP (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/161342/fewer-mention-economic-
issues-top-problem.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Z926-77YQ; Gun Control: Key Data 
Points from Pew Research, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 27, 2013), http://www.
pewresearch.org/key-data-points/gun-control-key-data-points-from-pew-research/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/LJC8-4G6S. 
59 See Alan Blinder, Trial Brings New Scrutiny of Self-Defense Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
7, 2014, at A11; Frances Robles, Retired Police Captain Feared Attack Before Shooting in 
Theater, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A15.  
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apparently law-abiding citizens who are lawfully carrying concealed 
handguns, will shape future public opinion. 
A. THE CRIME NARRATIVE 
In addition to the structural and cultural impediments to sustaining 
support for gun control, the writings of John Lott, Gary Kleck, and others 
have generated a new narrative that has undercut the perceived association 
between guns and violent crime.  The narrative began with Kleck’s 
argument for the crime deterring effects of guns through defensive gun use 
(DGU).60  Kleck, and later Kleck and Gertz, have argued that firearms are 
used as many as 2.5 million times per year to defend against crime.61  They 
base their conclusions on random telephone surveys that ask about the 
defensive use of guns.62  Alternatively, the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 
National Crime Victims Survey (NCVS) produces an estimate closer to 
70,000.63   
Both surveys were conducted by legitimate researchers, albeit using 
different methodology.64  The surveys used by Kleck initially asked directly 
about gun use to thwart crimes,65 while the NCVS questionnaire first asked 
if the respondent was the victim of a crime or attempted crime, followed by 
questions regarding what actions were taken to resist that crime.66  Kleck 
argues that the very low reporting rate to the NCVS results from fear of 
admitting gun use to a government agency.67  Yet when one examines the 
other responses to these high-rate surveys, serious questions arise.  Thirty 
percent of the respondents report that they probably or almost certainly 
saved a life through gun use.  This would translate into about 600,000 lives 
saved per year or 300 times the total reported murders in the United States.  
Likewise, the number of persons reported wounded by the respondents does 
not match possible reality.68 
 
60 VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 15. 
61 Gary Kleck & Mark Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of 
Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995). 
 62 Id. at 160. 
63 See id. at 153.   
 64 For NCVS methodology, see Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey 
(NCVS), BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&
iid=245#Methodology (last visited June 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YXQ8-
WXTS.  For the basic NCVS questionnaire, see NCVS 2 Incident Report, available at http:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs2_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N2UW-FJ5U. 
 65 See Kleck & Gertz, supra note 61, at 160–63. 
 66 See NCVS 2 Incident Report, supra note 64. 
67 Gary Kleck & Mark Gertz, Illegitimacy of One-Sided Speculation: Getting the 
Defensive Gun Use Estimate Down, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1446, 1446 (1997). 
68 See VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 15–19.  
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The likely answer is that a small number of respondents are 
exaggerating or lying.  Since only 1% of respondents, in the high-rate 
studies, report DGU, only a small percentage of false positives will result in 
very high estimates.69  Yet a critique of the methods and internal 
contradictions within the data offers a far less effective political argument 
than the claim that research proves guns prevent crimes. 
Even more than the DGU argument, the writing of economist John 
Lott has had wide circulation.  Lott’s More Guns, Less Crime, now in its 
fourth edition, has been sold widely and is still routinely quoted by control 
opponents in letters, in blogs, and in editorials.  Lott applied regression 
analysis to county level data and concluded that violent crime rates declined 
as the issuance of concealed carry licenses increased, which he attributes to 
deterrent effect.70  Lott continues to depend primarily upon his original 
analysis, which utilized crime figures from the late 1980s and early 1990s.71  
A number of scholars have critiqued Lott’s methodology, yet few members 
of the public have the background to evaluate econometric, quantitative 
models.72 
However, a natural experiment exists as a result of differing laws in 
the four most populous states.  California and New York have discretionary 
concealed permit issuance laws and low numbers of such permits.73  Texas 
and Florida both mandate issuance to all applicants not prohibited from 
possessing firearms, such as felons and minors.74  A comparison of violent 
crime and Part One crime rate changes in these states from the date of 
inception of the “shall issue” law to 2012 reveals that, in seven of the eight 
comparisons, the states with fewer permits have had greater decreases in 
 
69 See id. 
70 See JOHN LOTT, MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (2010) (utilizing regression analysis to argue 
that the issuance of concealed carry licenses have increased as violent crime rates have 
declined).  
71 Id. at 37–99. The time period for the data is significant, as this marked the beginning 
of a rapid nationwide drop in crime that continued through 2012. 
72 See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the ‘More Guns, Less Crime’ 
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (2003); William Alan Bartley & Mark A. Cohen, 
The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 
258, 258 (1998); Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Violent 
Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 219 (1998); John J. Donohue III, The Final Bullet in the 
Body of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 397, 397–99 
(2003); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 5 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1088  (2001); Steven 
D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the 
Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 175 (2004); Tomislav V. Kovandzic & 
Thomas B. Marvell, Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns and Violent Crime: Crime Control 
Through Gun Decontrol?, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 363, 368–74 (2003).  
 73 See NAT’L RIFLE ASSOC.-INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 38. 
 74 Id.  
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crime.75  Given the extended period that permissive carry laws have been in 
effect in Florida and Texas, and the very large and diverse populations of all 
four states, these figures should raise questions for anyone looking at Lott’s 
thesis.  Nevertheless, Lott’s work has been widely read and his thesis is 
routinely invoked, even by legislators.76  And the undeniable fact is that 
violent crime rates, and crime rates in general, declined between 1992 and 
2012 in spite of the ever-increasing number of firearms in American 
society.77  Although this rough correlation does not constitute evidence that 
firearms reduce crime, it serves to undercut previous arguments that firearm 
availability constituted the primary driver of earlier increases in violent 
crime rates. 
 
75 Calculation by author using FBI Uniform Crime Reports.  Part One crimes as defined 
by the FBI are criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.  The author made the following comparisons 
between violent crime rates and Part One crime rates: From 1995 to 2011: California to New 
York to Texas; from 1987 to 2011, California to New York to Florida. FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UCR DATA ONLINE, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/
index.cfm (last visited August 27, 2014) (For the 1995 to 2011 comparison, follow “Go to 
the table-building tool” hyperlink, then follow “All States and U.S. Total,” then follow “One 
year of data.”  In Column A, query “California, New York, Texas.”  In Column B, query  
“violent property rates” and “property crime rates.”  In Column C, query “1995.”  For 
“violent crime rate,” the values returned for California, New York and Texas should 
respectively be, when rounded to whole numbers, 966, 842, and 664.  To compute Part I 
crimes for each state, add the “violent crime rate” to the “property crime rate.”  The values 
returned for California, New York, and Texas should respectively be, when rounded to 
whole numbers, 4,865, 4,560, and 5,684.  Repeat this procedure for the year 2011 by 
switching the query in Column C to “2011.”  For “violent crime rate,” the values returned for 
California, New York and Texas should respectively be, when rounded to whole numbers, 
411, 398, 408.  For Part I crimes, the values should respectively be 2,995, 2,311, and 3,880.  
To compute the decline from 1995 to 2011 for all states, for example, take the 1995 “violent 
crime rate” for California (966), subtract by the 2011 “violent crime rate” for California 
(411) and divide by the 1995 “violent crime rate” to get a 57% rate of decline. When 
repeating this calculation for New York and Texas, the decline rates for violent crimes are 
respectively 53% and 38%.  When performing this calculation for “Part I” crimes, the 
decline rates for California, New York and Texas are respectively 38%, 49%, and 32%.  
Repeat the initial query for the 1987 to 2011 comparison for California, New York and 
Florida. When following these same steps, the calculations for the decline in “violent crime 
rates” are respectively 55%, 59%, and 49%.  The calculations for the decline in “Part I crime 
rates” are respectively 54%, 61%, and 59%. 
76 See Alex Seitz-Wald, Why Is the Media Rehabilitating John Lott?, SALON.COM (Dec. 
21, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/12/21/why_is_the_media_rehabilitating_
john_lott/, archived at http://perma.cc/8LB7-BA3S; Sean Sullivan, GOP Rep. Gohmert: 
More Access to Guns Could Avert Mass Shootings, WASH. POST. (Dec. 16, 2012, 11:47 
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/12/16/gop-rep-gohmert-more-
access-to-guns-could-avert-mass-shootings/, archived at http://perma.cc/H7J8-VHE7. 
77 Both the Uniform Crime Report and the National Crime Victim Survey support the 
conclusion that crime dropped significantly between the early 1990s and 2012. 
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III. POLICY 
A. LIMITED POLICY OPTIONS 
Future policy options are constrained by politics, law, and facts on the 
ground.  In Heller, the Court made it clear that prohibitions on possession 
by some classes of persons are constitutional.78  Thus, laws restricting 
felons, minors, and those who are adjudicated mentally ill seem unlikely to 
be in danger.  Likewise, any attempt at prohibition or quasi-prohibition of 
firearms not currently prohibited would appear to fail the constitutional 
standard.79  Thus, future fights will likely focus on concealed and open 
carry laws, licensing, and registration.  In addition, the courts will almost 
assuredly have to face the issue of restrictions on military-style firearms.  
Assuming the courts do not overturn current restrictions on machine guns 
and destructive devices, a fairly safe assumption, the fight will focus on 
permit systems and semiautomatic, military-style rifles, often referred to as 
assault weapons. 
Even within the confines of what is allowed under the current 
interpretation of the Second Amendment, efforts at any additional federal 
regulation face several hurdles.  The first is the current strength of 
conservative political forces and the opposition to gun control among 
members of the Republican Party and other conservatives.80  The power of 
such opposition is intensified by the bicameral nature of Congress and the 
Republican structural advantage at the state and federal level, resulting from 
2010 redistricting and a lack of active public support for gun control.81 
In addition to limits set by the Second Amendment, the Tenth 
Amendment also constitutes a constraint on federal options.  In Printz v. 
United States, the Court ruled that the Tenth Amendment barred the federal 
government from requiring state and local law enforcement to conduct 
record checks of gun buyers.82  Previously, the Court had ruled in United 
States v. Lopez that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause powers 
by restricting guns on or near school grounds.83  Although these decisions 
do not apply exclusively to firearms controls, they do set limits on 
 
78 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008). 
79 Although Heller left numerous questions as to the exact nature of the constitutional 
standard, the decision made clear that prohibition of commonly possessed firearms did not 
meet that standard.  Id. at 624–25.  
80 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 58. 
81 Even when a majority supports a specific control, activity and intensity favor the 
opposition. 
82 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933–34 (1997). 
83 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
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congressional authority to devise regulation strategies that mandate any 
state or local action. 
Finally, the sheer size of the gun-owning population and its wide 
distribution throughout the populace presents significant problems in 
crafting any uniform national regulation.  Although it is impossible to 
exactly calculate the number of firearms in the country, the number likely 
exceeds 300 million.84  Although existing barriers seem to preclude policy 
change, eventually all public policy is subject to change.  A hundred years 
of Jim Crow laws and “separate but equal” jurisprudence imploded in the 
second half of the twentieth century.  The New Deal coalition and the 
expansion of the welfare state looked inevitable in 1964, but not in 1968.  
In the case of gun control, demographics seem to portend the potential for 
future change.  Notwithstanding the surge in gun sales that occurred in 
reaction to proposed changes in federal law following the Sandy Hook 
shooting, the long-term trend in gun ownership and in hunting is 
downward.85  In an ever more urbanized nation, in which fewer young 
people develop interest in and attachment to guns and shooting sports, the 
political balance will inevitably shift over time.  This trend will likely be 
amplified by the increasing electoral influence of women and minorities, 
who reflect less special interest support for gun rights and generally support 
more liberal candidates.86 
B. OBJECTIVES FOR FUTURE POLICY 
Rational policy formulation argues for useful and attainable goals.  
Too often, advocates have pursued regulation for its own sake.  Three 
potential goals stand out as having these useful and attainable 
characteristics: 
(1) Reduce gun possession and carrying by high-risk individuals. 
(2) Reduce access to firearms by prohibited persons. 
(3) Utilize firearms laws to incapacitate violent, career offenders. 
 
84 William J. Vizzard, Firearms Industry, in GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND LAW 290 (Gregg Lee Carter ed., 2nd 
ed. 2013).  
85 Id. at 289–90. 
86 See Ronald Brownstein, Stark Divide Between Blacks, Whites on Gun Control and 
Health Care, NAT'L J. (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressional-
connection/coverage/stark-divide-between-blacks-whites-on-gun-control-and-health-care-
20130926, archived at http://perma.cc/FS5B-BQN7; Taegan Goddard, Why New Gun 
Controls Are Inevitable, THE WEEK (Jan 15 2013, 9:17 AM), http://theweek.com/article/
index/238772/why-new-gun-controls-are-inevitable, archived at http://perma.cc/9V3P-
PCUX. 
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 Access to firearms facilitates robbery, serious assault, and homicide.  
An examination of the circumstances of stranger homicides reveals a 
common pattern of young males, often under twenty-one years of age or 
with prior felony convictions, acting with little to no prior planning in 
response to challenge or conflict.87  Routine activity theory postulates crime 
occurs when a motivated offender encounters an available victim in the 
absence of a capable guardian.88  An offender must be capable as well as 
motivated.  Reducing the immediate availability of a firearm by making 
acquisition more difficult and possession more risky directly attacks that 
capability. 
The available evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that 
prohibited persons acquire guns most often from acquaintances or the 
secondary market.89  Offenders and traffickers have a continuing need to 
replenish their supply of firearms from the primary market.90  Policy should 
focus on increasing risk for transfer of firearms to prohibited persons, 
stemming the flow of new firearms from the primary or legal market to the 
secondary or unlicensed market, and reducing or eliminating trafficking in 
this secondary market.  Unlicensed traffickers lack both the motivation and 
capacity to determine the eligibility of a purchaser to lawfully receive the 
firearm and typically sell to all potential buyers.91 
Although regulating the secondary market primarily faces opposition 
from conservatives and the gun lobby, the third objective generates 
opposition from liberals.  Because the U.S. criminal justice system has 
overutilized incarceration as a response to crime, any proposal advancing 
the use of incarceration as a crime prevention mechanism faces immediate 
suspicion and opposition from liberals, particularly criminologists.92  While 
 
87 The author has observed homicide events for fifty years.  They routinely result from a 
perceived slight or challenge that escalates, or from gang members detecting a violation of 
their turf.  See also RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, ARMED ROBBERS IN ACTION 
(1997).  The authors’ interviews of armed robbers document the tendency for spontaneous, 
risky behavior that is facilitated by the presence of a firearm.  For characteristics of homicide 
events, see Evelyn M. Kuhn, et al., Victim and Perpetrator Characteristics for Firearm-
Related Homicides of Youth During 1991–1997, in THE VARIETIES OF HOMICIDE AND ITS 
RESEARCH: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 MEETING OF THE HOMICIDE RESEARCH WORKING 
GROUP 111, 111 (Paul H. Blackman et al., eds.), available at http://umaine.edu/socialwork/
files/2014/02/femicide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K7CA-7N93. 
 88 See Nicholas Branic, Routine Activities Theory,  ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIME & PUNISHMENT 
(forthcoming 2014).  
89 See VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 29–31. 
90 Phillip J. Cook, et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 
63–64, 68–71 (1995).  See also William J. Vizzard, A Systematic Approach to Controlling 
Firearms Markets, 11 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 177, 179 (1999). 
91 See VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 29–31. 
92 See NAT'L POLICY COMM., THE USE OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
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these constitute valid concerns, they should not automatically preclude 
consideration of targeted use of incarceration.  Available research, as well 
as my own experience, support the conclusion that a subset of about 20% of 
active offenders routinely possesses and uses firearms.93  The same research 
seems to support the conclusion that this group commits all crime at a rate 
higher than the average incarcerated offender and commits about half of all 
violent crime.94  Effective enforcement of the prohibition against felons 
possessing firearms offers a useful mechanism for targeting this subset of 
offenders.95 
C. OPTIONS 
If political dynamics change adequately to open the policy window, 
policy entrepreneurs should focus on pursuing the forgoing goals while 
minimizing the burden these policies place on legitimate gun owners and 
licensed dealers.  Because over 100 million citizens possess firearms and 
because most firearms dealers are small businesses, policies should be 
easily understood and easily followed.  Any policy that demonizes gun 
owners, or any policy advocacy that does so, will generate massive 
resistance. 
Effective policy faces multiple hurdles.  First, it must become 
legislation.  This means advocates must craft the policy to appeal to a 
coalition large enough to constitute a majority in the electorate.  Second, it 
must not alienate a powerful minority, creating opposition that would 
thwart its passage and implementation.  Finally, it must be successfully 
implemented.  As Pressman and Wildavsky clearly demonstrated in their 
seminal work on policy implementation, simply instituting a public policy 
does not assure the desired result.96  Although successful implementation 
depends on executive branch functionaries, legislators can produce policy 
 
POLICY PAPER PRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POLICY COMMITTEE TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY 
OF CRIMINOLOGY (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.asc41.com/policies/
policypaper1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8HC8-WTAK; Understanding the 
Incarceration Binge: Author, Robert Perkinson Candidly Discusses Punishment in America, 
ACJS NOW (ACJS, Greenbelt, MD), Aug. 2011, at 8–9; HARVARD UNIV. INST. OF POLITICS 
MASS INCARCERATION POLICY GROUP, COMMUNICATION OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: A 
STRATEGIC OUTREACH PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION,  (May 2013), available at http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/
default/files_new/research-policy-papers/Mass%20Incarceration%20Policy%20Paper.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ASM-7HNA. 
93 See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS 13 
(1997).  
94 See id. at 13, 75.  
95 This will be discussed in more detail infra at Part III.C.  
96 JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION  (1973).  
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that either lays the groundwork for implementation or virtually assures that 
implementation will fail.  To be successful, the policy should focus on clear 
objectives, account for the implementation environment, maximize 
incentives for compliance, and allow for adaptive change as operators gain 
experience.  Unfortunately, crafting policy that will pass a legislature may 
require none of these. 
Several modest, but workable, options exist at the federal level.  
Congress could revoke 18 U.S.C. 922(t)(2)(C), the existing prohibition on 
retaining information on criminal record checks for gun sales; the restriction 
in 18 U.S.C. 926(a) on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) retaining firearms purchaser information, and 18 U.S.C. 
923(g)(3)(B), the restriction on sharing firearms trace information with state 
and local police.  The firearms lobby would characterize this as a national 
registration system; however, it falls far short of that.97  It would eliminate 
the need for the arcane system of tracing firearms that now exists.98  It 
would also allow ATF to institute a regulation requiring all licensees to 
report transfers to other licensees.  This would eliminate the potential for 
licensed dealers to order guns, fail to enter them in their required log, and 
then sell them under the counter with no records and record checks of the 
owners.  Currently, ATF inspectors have no means of determining if the 
dealer has listed all firearms received. 
In addition, Congress could reinstate a felony statute for willful 
falsification of dealer records. FOPA reduced this offense to a 
misdemeanor, even when the dealer fails to record large numbers of guns or 
intentionally falsifies his records.99  This change virtually assured that U.S. 
Attorneys would not charge this offense.100  Although the majority of 
licensed firearms dealers comply with the law, detecting and prosecuting 
those who do not presents a significant enforcement problem.101 
FOPA also defined “engaging in the firearms business” as requiring 
livelihood and profit.102  The nature of this current definition, which allows 
traffickers to claim the status of hobbyists and collectors, creates ambiguity 
 
97 True registration, as required by the NFA, criminalizes possession of a firearm not 
registered to the possessor and subjects such firearms to seizure. 
98 See Melissa Block, The Low-Tech Way Guns Get Traced, NPR (May 20, 2013, 5:11 
PM),  h t tp : / /www.npr .org/ 2013/05 /20 /185530763/the - lo w-tech-way-guns-
get-traced, archived at http://perma.cc/Y2AH-9J93. 
 99 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (2012). 
100 U.S. Attorneys seldom file misdemeanor cases, particularly if the cases involve 
complex violations. 
101 See WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, IN THE CROSS FIRE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BUREAU 
OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS 40–42 (1997). 
 102 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)–(22) (2012).  
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for enforcers and citizens alike, and frustrates prosecution of illegal 
traffickers.  A bright line would benefit both persons trying to comply with 
the law and those who enforce it.  The obvious remedy for this is to set a 
number of sales or offers for sale—for example, six per year—that trigger 
the need for a license.  This would impose a burden on unlicensed 
individuals who make a regular habit of buying and selling guns at gun 
shows, but that would be the point.   
Currently, the law restricts dealers’ licenses to those intending to 
engage in the business.  Fees are $200 for initial application and $30 per 
year for renewal.103  ATF must determine through the totality of 
circumstances if the applicant really intends to engage in the business.  
Thus, an individual can be denied a license or subsequent license renewal 
based on the failure to keep regular business hours at a commercial 
premise.104  If ATF fails to renew the license and the individual continues 
engaging in gun sales, the agency is placed in the position of charging 
someone for dealing without a license after having denied renewal or 
issuance of the license.  Although such a prosecution may be legally sound 
under current law, it seems contradictory to the layman and has been the 
source of conflict between ATF and gun rights advocates.105  To remove the 
ambiguity, Congress could eliminate the intent-to-engage requirement and 
raise the fee to a level that would support the cost of issuing licenses and 
conducting yearly inspections.  The only rational justification for limiting 
dealer licenses to those actively selling firearms is to reduce the total 
number of dealers, thus reducing the burden that additional dealers place on 
effective regulation and enforcement.  If the dealer fees offset the cost of 
enforcement, and the applicant otherwise qualifies, this problem ceases to 
exist.  Higher fees would reduce the number of inactive dealers and those 
remaining would offset the cost of overseeing them with their fees. 
Requiring private sellers to transfer firearms through licensed dealers, 
thus subjecting the purchaser to Brady checks, offers significant potential 
for restricting the indiscriminate sale of firearms to strangers at gun shows 
and via newspaper or internet ads.  The highly public nature of these two 
mediums allows for broad enforcement at minimum cost and with 
minimum government intrusion into private behavior.  This requirement 
would likely prove far less effective in controlling occasional sales or 
transfers between familiars.  Since 1991, California has required the 
 
 103 18 U.S.C. § 923(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
104 William J. Vizzard, The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 79, 
90–91 (1999).  
105 See VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 123–24.  
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transferor of any firearm to do so through a licensed dealer.106  However, 
California has devoted few if any resources to informing the public of the 
law or enforcing the law, and few residents have complied with the 
requirement.107  Jacobs and Potter addressed the problems associated with 
enforcing such a requirement in their 1995 critique of Cook, et al.’s analysis 
of primary and secondary markets.108  This focus on the mechanics of 
implementation, so often absent from policy analysis, raises valid issues.  
Establishing an illegal transfer after the fact presents significant 
investigative and legal difficulties.109  However, Jacobs and Potter did not 
address the utility of such a requirement in constraining sales by unlicensed 
dealers.  Failure to follow the records check process constitutes a separate 
violation from the unlicensed dealing.  Undercover purchases would 
generate almost insurmountable evidence of a violation.  Thus, even 
without a revision of the definition of engaging in the business, an effective 
mechanism would exist to address unlicensed and indiscriminate trafficking 
in firearms, curtail advertisements for sales to strangers, and prevent 
indiscriminate sales at gun shows. 
Although a requirement to conduct a record check for all private 
transfers by routing them through licensed dealers would have limited 
impact on casual sales between acquaintances or the use of straw 
purchasers, it would constrain a currently unregulated secondary market 
that flourishes around gun shows, and progressively the Internet.  Jacobs 
has appropriately pointed out the fallacy of trying to control only sales at 
gun shows, arguing that sellers wishing to avoid the record check 
requirement could agree to sell at the gun show and consummate the sale 
later.110  This argument reflects some lack of experience with gun shows.  
Based on this author’s extensive experience attending gun shows, it seems 
likely that many unlicensed sellers sell far too many guns to efficiently 
arrange sales for later dates.  However, some number would do so.  
Requiring all transfers, or all transfers other than those to close relatives and 
 
106 CAL. PENAL CODE § 28050 (West 2012). 
107 Reported sales by dealers outnumber those originating with non-licensed individuals 
eight to one; data for 2011–2013 provided to author by California Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Firearms (Jan. 31, 2014).   
108 See generally James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns out of the 
“Wrong” Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 93 (1995) (critiquing Cook et al.’s analysis). 
109 Id. at 110–12; see also VIZZARD, supra note 7, at 158–64.  The only parties with 
direct knowledge of venue and circumstances of the event have rights against self-
incrimination.  Absent registration or a requirement to report loss or theft, the transferor can 
claim either of these or transfer to an unidentified third party who was not a prohibited 
person.  
110 See JACOBS, supra note 31, at 130–32, 134–36.  
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temporary transfers for hunting or competition, to go through record 
checks, would make selling to strangers far more vulnerable to enforcement 
action.  Jacobs further makes the point that sales between individuals are 
difficult to detect and to prosecute absent some system of required 
registration; he is correct on both counts.111  However, Jacobs overlooked 
the deterrent effect on repeat sellers.  
While law enforcement lacks a mechanism, absent compulsory 
registration, for determining that a gun transferred without the proper 
process as well as means of proving the facts of the transfer, repeat sellers 
are vulnerable to purchases by informants and undercover law enforcement 
officers.  Unlike drug dealers, gun sellers must constantly seek new 
customers.  Although some customers will make repeated purchases if guns 
are confiscated, lost, stolen, or discarded, guns do not wear out readily.  By 
dealing with new customers, traffickers put themselves at far greater risk 
than dealing with a fixed customer base.  In addition, guns are difficult to 
hide and discard on short notice, making evidence easier to seize.  Any 
effort to sell via newspaper or Internet ads without proper transfer puts even 
the occasional seller at risk.  Thus, Jacobs’s conclusion—that the 
requirement for all sales to be conducted through a dealer is 
unenforceable—applies only to occasional sales, not to volume trafficking. 
D. REGISTRATION AND LICENSING 
Enforcing controls on the secondary market and policing individual 
transfers to prohibited persons would prove far easier if the United States 
had a comprehensive system of licensing and registration for firearms 
owners and firearms.  In effect, a license would provide a pre-clearance of 
the purchaser.  The current problem of following up ambiguous dispositions 
to arrests and mental commitments before a firearm sale can be approved 
would cease, as this action could occur before the issuance of a license.  
Such a system would undercut any defense that the transferor of a firearm 
did not realize the recipient’s status or the need to conduct the transfer 
through a licensed dealer.  Even straw purchasers who buy guns for 
prohibited persons using their own identification would have to obtain a 
permit.  Requiring a minimum of training, some sort of competency 
examination, and positive identification to obtain a permit would likely 
deter many straw purchasers, who can now simply fill out a simple form 
and show a driver’s license.112 
 
111 See id. at 131, 135–36.  
112 These are the typical minimum requirements proposed by advocates of firearms 
licensing.  See S. 1878, 103d Cong. (1994). 
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Unfortunately, any permit and licensing system faces numerous 
practical, political, and legal hurdles.  The sheer size of the existing 
firearms inventory and the number of gun owners constitute two of the 
greatest hurdles.  Although the exact number of firearms cannot be 
determined, the best estimate is somewhere over 300 million and 
growing.113  The number of gun owners proves equally ambiguous, but may 
well approach 100 million.114  Any effort to register this many firearms in 
the possession of so many individuals presents a formidable task both 
practically and politically.  Other than the Internal Revenue Service and the 
Social Security Administration, the federal government lacks any agency 
with the infrastructure and experience to handle such a task, but this 
function does not fit with the existing role or culture of either agency.  In 
addition, both agencies seem stretched to their limit with their current 
functions.  The task could be simplified if the states took on the primary 
responsibility and the federal government provided a central repository of 
information.  State motor vehicle departments have both the type of 
experience and infrastructure that would be required, although not the 
resources. 
The federal government has succeeded in convincing state legislatures 
to insert uniform standards into state law in areas such as auto safety, 
drinking age, environmental regulation, and educational testing.  However, 
recent state resistance to support for universal health care and the 
establishment of state exchanges demonstrates a very different political 
environment than that of past years.  Given the pattern of actions in many 
states on concealed carry and efforts by some states to block enforcement of 
existing federal firearms laws, cooperation seems highly unlikely in a 
majority of states.  Any federal effort to mandate state action would face a 
constitutional challenge invoking the Printz precedent. 
An alternative, advanced in the Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, 
would impose registration more gradually by registering firearms only at 
the time of transfer.115  This approach would leave millions of unregistered 
firearms to migrate into the secondary, illegal market and eliminate the 
 
113 Vizzard, supra note 84, at 290.   
114 Survey data shows that the percentage of respondents stating that they personally own 
guns varied between 27% and 34% over the past ten years.  Using the median of 30.5% 
multiplied by the population of the United States, the number of gun owners “approaches” 
100 million.  See Gun Ownership Trends and Demographics, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR 
THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (March 12, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/12/
section-3-gun-ownership-trends-and-demographics, archived at http://perma.cc/5CPG-
99CA.  
115 S. 1878, 103d Cong. (1994).  
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primary benefit of registration.116  An effective registration system allows 
police officers to make an instant determination of the legal status of the 
firearm, just as licensing allows instant determination of the legal status of 
the possessor.  A hybrid system like that advanced in the Gun Violence 
Prevention Act undercuts the very justification for either system. 
Given the practical, political, and legal barriers that currently exist, 
there seems little likelihood of Congress approving any uniform national 
system of either firearm registration or firearm owner licensing.  The same 
conclusion appears probable for the majority of state legislatures. 
E. FOCUS ON FELONS 
A strategy that has received little attention is to focus on using 
firearms laws to incapacitate the highest risk offenders.  As previously 
cited, research indicates that a subset of active offenders account for over 
half the criminal impact.117  This same group self-reported routinely 
possessing and carrying firearms.118  This behavior renders this group 
vulnerable to the use of firearms statutes.  By definition, most are 
prohibited persons as a result of felony convictions.  Many are subject to 
parole and probation searches.  Police agencies often target this same group 
for focus and attention by career offender units.119  Yet police efforts often 
focus on apprehending members of this group during crimes such as 
burglary or robbery.  In practice, this strategy faces three hurdles.  First, 
even active offenders engage in criminal conduct for very short periods of 
time, necessitating extended covert surveillance by law enforcement.  
Second, offenders are at their highest level of alertness immediately before, 
during, and after committing offenses, making surveillance most difficult.  
Third, apprehension before an offense occurs likely precludes prosecution, 
while apprehension during or after creates high risk for police and public.120  
Yet to allow an offense to take place puts police at great risk of public 
condemnation. 
In this author’s experience, police officers have historically often felt 
the need to apprehend offenders during or immediately after a primary 
 
116 For a detailed discussion of problems associated with this approach, see JACOBS, 
supra note 31, at 137–52.  
117 WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 93, at 75.   
118 Id. at 13. 
 119 SUSAN E. MARTIN & LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICE FOUND., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
CATCHING CAREER CRIMINALS 11 (July 1986), available at http://www.policefoundation.org/
content/catching-career-criminals-0, archived at http://perma.cc/4S7D-A3RP. 
120 Thirty years of law enforcement experience and fifty years of following criminal 
behavior have convinced the author that arresting a suspect during an offense generates a 
fight or flight response likely to precipitate violent behavior or risky flight.  
902 VIZZARD [Vol. 104 
offense has occurred to assure evidence necessary to prosecute the offender.  
Apprehending an offender with a firearm at a less risky time has less appeal 
to these officers, because the possession of firearms by felons has been 
viewed as a less serious “status offense.”  Such offenses have historically 
often received less investigative and prosecutorial attention because the law 
treats them as less serious offenses.  Sentencing serves as a proxy for 
importance in the world of criminal law. 
Operationally, prosecution of serious offenders for firearm possession 
offers a number of advantages.  The primary witnesses usually consist of 
law enforcement officers, who are likely to be more effective witnesses than 
the typical victim, and who are more likely to appear in court.  A possession 
charge offers few defensive strategies when the gun is on the person.121  
Although discovery in a home or car resulting from a parole/probation 
search or search warrant requires more investigation to substantiate intent 
and capacity to possess, suppression of evidence proves difficult in such 
scenarios.122 
Ironically, during two decades in which sentences for a variety of 
crime, particularly those involving narcotics and sexual assaults, were 
widely increased, legislatures have largely ignored firearm possession 
offenses.  Congress did, however, institute mandatory sentences for felons 
in possession who had three prior violent crimes or serious drug offenses.123  
Only California included felon in possession in its career offender law.124  
Elevation of the sentencing potential for felons possessing firearms would 
have to overcome the current reaction over sentencing of minor drug 
offenders and other mandatory sentencing that has expanded prison 
populations and has generated negative reaction from scholars, the legal 
profession and, most recently, the public.  The most visible example of the 
reaction to this overreach is evident in the successful passage of Proposition 
36, which greatly reduced the number of offenses constituting a third strike 
under California law. 125 
 
121 The primary defense available is to suppress the search.  However, Terry stops 
specifically allow checking for weapons.  Thus the discovery of a firearm offers a difficult 
set of facts for the defense. 
122 See William J. Vizzard, Reexamining the Importance of Firearm Investigations, 68 
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 1–6 (May 1999). 
123 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). 
124 California’s Three Strikes Law originally included all felonies as a third strike.  
However, Proposition 36, passed by the voters in 2012, redefined the law and eliminated 
felon in possession offenses as a third strike in the process.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 667 (Deering, 
LEXIS through 2014 Sess.).  
 125 See PROPOSITION 36, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/36-title-
summ-analysis.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8DGB-HCQS; Tracey Kaplan, Three-
Strikers’ Families Hope for Early Release, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 8, 2012, at A13. 
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Longer sentencing of repeat felons with firearms differs from 
California’s three strikes mandatory twenty-five years to life sentence for 
any felony126 or the disproportionate federal sentences for crack cocaine.127  
Both of these grew out of moral panics that generated political responses.  
Unlike the crack cocaine sentences, this approach would not apply to young 
persons with little or no criminal history.  Unlike the original California 
approach, it would not target low risk, chronic offenders.  Active offenders, 
who make a practice of carrying firearms, constitute a very high-risk 
population.  Choosing to attain a firearm illegally constitutes a conscious, 
planned offense.  Even the decision to carry a firearm often involves more 
opportunity for thoughtful reflection than the decision to use the firearm.  
The combination of persons with a predilection for violence and firearms is 
very dangerous. 
Although increasing the likelihood of incarceration for firearms 
possession by persons with prior violent felony convictions would not face 
the entrenched opposition of conservatives and the gun lobby, it will likely 
face opposition from some liberals and scholars who will see it as just 
another effort to utilize incarceration as the sole response to crime.  
Reducing this opposition would require convincing elites, particularly 
attorneys and social scientists, that this is a limited effort directed only at 
those offenders who pose the greatest risk and are the least amenable to 
rehabilitation and not a new push for massive incarceration. 
F. POLICY CHANGES UNLIKELY 
Long-term demographic trends do seem to foretell a slow decline in 
American gun culture, with both hunting and gun ownership reflecting this 
trend.128  Although this would seem to imply an improving environment for 
additional gun control, significant policy change in the area of gun 
regulation seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.  The current state of 
national politics constitutes the greatest immediate bar to legislation.  
Beyond that, the entrenched power of gun control opponents, combined 
 
 126 See PEN. § 667. 
 127 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder 
Urges Changes in Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Reserve Harshest Penalties for Most 
Serious Drug Traffickers, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 13, 2014), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/March/14-ag-263.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AAY7-7X4E. 
128 See Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Share of Homes with Guns Shows 4-
Decade Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2013, at A1.  U.S. Fish and Wildlife data on hunting 
licenses reflect that they peaked in 1982 at nearly 16.8 million and have declined to about 
14.6 million in 2013.  See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE HISTORICAL HUNTING LICENSE 
DATA, available at http://wsfrprograms.fws.gov/Subpages/LicenseInfo/Hunting.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3BMQ-4M3V. 
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with the practical problems of designing a workable regulatory policy that 
can be implemented for such a large gun-owning population with over 300 
million guns, constitute long-term barriers that will not dissolve readily, 
even if the political environment becomes less acrimonious and more 
cooperative. 
In the near and intermediate term, decentralized efforts directed at 
reducing gun carrying and violent behavior among at-risk populations seem 
to offer the most potential for reducing gun violence.  Two important facts 
regarding homicide should inform policy: many homicides are spontaneous 
actions facilitated by the presence of firearms, and second, these homicides 
are concentrated culturally and geographically.129  As Malcolm Gladwell 
has so convincingly argued, social change does not follow a linear 
trajectory, but spreads like an epidemic.130  Changing a few critical actors 
holds the key to initiating the spread of a social norm and social behavior.  
Interventions that change norms relating to gun carrying and acceptance of 
violence as normal behavior among high-risk populations offer significant 
potential for reducing death and serious injury from firearms.  Ceasefire 
projects would seem to offer more near-term hope for reducing violence 
than does the frustrated pursuit of new national gun laws.131 
 
 
129 See CHERYL L. MAXSON ET AL., NAT’L CRIM. JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., ADOLESCENT 
HOMICIDES IN LOS ANGELES: ARE THEY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER HOMICIDES? (DRAFT)  
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